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This  paper  studies  the  structural  transformation  of  Russia  in  1885-1940  from an  agrarian  to  an 
industrial economy. To do so, time-series for Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union during 1885-1940 
are reconstructed and a methodology is developed that allows us to identify the different factors that 
had  the  largest  quantitative  impact  on  Russia’s  economic  development,  through  the  reduction  of 
frictions in the productive process. The results of the research showed that investment was the main 
economic  variable  in  diminishing  the  production  frictions.  War  communism  exacerbated  market 
distortions in the production process, due to their extremist policies in extremely harsh times. During 
Stalin’s Five-Year Plans, investment was channeled through the granted easy credit of the Gosbank to 
fund the impossible high production objectives. This set of policies seemed to have the largest impact 
in the reduction of the production market frictions of the analyzed period, particularly, the first Five 
Year Plan. At the contrary, education was not found significant in the reduction of the production 
frictions and, as expected, frictions remained high during the Tsarist Period, deterring industrialization.
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1   Introduction 
The main aim of this paper is to analyze the industrialization of Russia by finding the main obstacles 
that impeded its structural transformation. Actually, the most persuasive evidence regarding Russia’s 
growth pattern was the increase of 3.3 percent per annum from 1885 to 1913 and rising investment 
rates. However, when the structural change is analyzed the success becomes feeble. Indeed, in 1913 
the peasantry formed the seventy-five percent of the population, a modest reduction from 1860 levels. 
Another indicator would be the agricultural sector accounting for the 59 percent of the economy in 
1885, decreasing just to one half in 1913. As a consequence, many questions arose in describing why 
and how Russia was a developing economy with a lethargic pace.
Traditionally, it has been argued (Murphy et al., 1989) that Russia’s industrialization was the 
consequence of a “Big-Push” model implemented by Stalin’s economic goals, known as “The Five-
year plans”. However, this has been proved inaccurate, due to the fact that the observed “Big Push” 
models showed the opposite results to what it should have been expected . Moreover among others, 2
Lenin  (1894,  pp.  74-75)  and  Gerschenkron  (1965),  suggested  that  the  main  impediment  to 
development was caused by the archaic agricultural institutions (the obshchina)  in Tsarist Russia, 3
which  reduced  the  rural-urban  mobility  (labor  friction),  as  happened  in  Japan  before  the  WWII 
(Hayashi et al., 2008). Nonetheless, one more time this has been proved inexact.
On the  other  hand,  many historians  (Davies,  1994;  Crisp,  1978)  claimed that  the  market 
frictions, were the most important obstacles to economic development at the turn of the 19th century. 
Indeed, the historical evidence points out the role of monopoly capitalism. This friction was caused by 
the  privileges  that  the  manufacturing companies  relished from 1895 until  1914.  This  fact  can be 
observed through Tsarist Russia’s corporate law, where the registration of any joint stock company 
required a special concession from the tsar, who personally signed the corporate charter, causing the 
creation of  cartels  (sindikaty) .  Moreover,  due to  the  barriers  of  entry  and the  derived monopoly 4
power, these sindikaty kept their production at low levels and their markups-to-marginal costs ratios at 
high levels in order to obtain large profits. Additionally, they were able to determine the sales quotas 
for their members and the wholesale prices (Davies et al., 1994, p. 2). Consequently, this monopolistic 
power led to an inefficient low demand for capital and labor in the manufacturing sector and a low 
investment  in  the  manufacturing  sector  (Cheremukhin  et  al,  2017).  Thus,  Russian  industrialists 
retained market power not only in the goods market but also in the labor market, maximizing their 
 A well known formalization of the “Big Push” model predicts that industrialization should result in both a higher manufacturing TFP and a 2
higher labor frictions. 
 Obshchina,  Rus: община. Lit. Trans.: Commune / Selskoye obshestvo, Rus: Cельское общество,  Trans: Village community3
 Sindikat, Rus: синдикат. Lit. Trans: Syndicate. It is a cartel agreement that involves the sale of its participants' products through a single 4
sales agency set up in the form of a joint-stock company or an LLC.
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profits by reducing their output below the socially optimal level. Hence, the barriers to entry and the 
resulting  monopoly  distortions  in  the  manufacturing  sector  were  an  important  reason  for  the 
“backwardness”  of  Russia’s  economy in  the  end  of  the  19th  century.  Cheremukhin  et  al.  (2017) 
acknowledged  these  facts  through  their  wedge  accounting  method.  The  main  logic  behind  this 5
analysis  lays  on  the  tangibility  of  the  mechanisms  of  the  Russian  economic  history,  where  they 
represent themselves as deviations from the values of the optimality conditions in the model. Thus, an 
efficient  economy  could  be  observed  if  frictions  in  the  market  were  nonexistent  or  quite  low, 
permitting the optimal allocation of resources across sectors within the country. Nonetheless, these 
authors found that the Russian economy was seriously distorted. Furthermore, they discovered that 
these distortions were predominantly influenced by the frictions in the production process, where the 
marginal  product  of  labor  in  the  manufacturing sector  was  substantially  higher  than the  workers’ 
earnings,  indicating  significant  markups  in  the  non-agricultural  sector  for  the  1885-1913  period. 
Hence,  their  discoveries  expanded the  support  for  the  role  of  monopoly  capitalism in  explaining 
Russia’s backwardness. 
Alternatively,  it  could be also observed that  the Soviet  economy from 1920 to  1939 was 
unsuccessful, in productivity terms, in both the manufacturing and the agricultural sectors. Indeed, the 
total factor productivity (TPF) actually diminished by 20% during 1928-1932.  Nevertheless, the most 6
interesting insight of these period is how the intersectoral frictions substantially declined, entailing 
into a rapid structural change and GDP growth. Yet, another interesting observation unearths from this 
fact:  as  Cheremukhin  et  al  (2017)  showed,  the  reduction  in  distortions  is  mostly  explained  by  a 
dramatic  decline  in  the  production  process  frictions,  where  the  decrease  of  the  markup  in  the 
manufacturing sector drives the decline. Hence, again the variation in the reduction in the production 
component of the frictions (wedges) accounts for most of the structural change that occurred during 
Stalin’s period, and significantly contributes to the expansion of real GDP per capita, being the role of 
other frictions relatively low.
Therefore, this research aims for the identification of the causes that induced the reduction of 
the markup and, simultaneously, the decline in the production process frictions and the increase in 
GDP. Hence, this will help us to understand how Russia industrialized by checking and establishing a 
clear connection between the traditional literature and the recent research findings. Thus, in order to 
proceed,  this  study will  check econometrically  how the  main economic variables  and the  sets  of 
policies  from  the  different  governments,  that  took  place  throughout  the  studied  period  of  time 
(1885-1940), affected the production wedge. 
 Firstly carried out by Chari et al. (2007); any set of policies can be mapped into a set of distortions, frictions or wedges, in a neoclassical 5
growth model.
 Cheremukhin et al. (2013)6
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Moreover, a new time series has been estimated in order to proceed with this enquiry. The data for the 
different main analyzed economic variables have been enlarged, incorporating the missing years for 
the  WWI,  the  Russian  Civil  War  and  the  NEP.  Thus  comprising  a  time  set  from 1913 to  1928. 
Nevertheless, for the whole time series (1885-1940) new variables have also been constructed  and 
modified: Literacy Rate, Inflation and Population, respectively. (See Section 6 and Appendix A).
The results of our research show that Stalin policies during the first 5-year plan, particularly 
the lax provision of bank credit (soft credit/budget constraints) to the heavy industry SOEs (State 
Owned Enterprise) along with high production objectives, permitted Russia to industrialize. Moreover, 
the evidence shows how War Communism expanded drastically the frictions due to the policies that 
were carried out. These extreme measures included forced nationalization of firms, collectivization of 
lands and seizing the private property. However, this must be also contextualized in the extreme times 
of the Russia Civil War, which worsened the situation. As expected, we find no impact of the Tsarist 
time,  since  the  Production  Wedge  remained  constant  and  high,  deterring  Industrialization. 
Consequently,  investment  in  the  different  forms acted  as  the  main  economic  variable  driving the 
production  wedge  down.  Contrary  to  the  literature  suggesting  that  education  may  have  had  an 
important role in the industrialization (Allen, 2003; Galor & Moav, 2006), we find no evidence in 
support of this claim for Russia. Thus, the results defend the previous literature main assumptions, 
except for education, and confirms the methodology used by Cheremukhin et al. (2017). These results 
allow us to better understand how policies, conflicts and different economic systems may affect the 
society of a country through the economy. This research also lets us observe what could occur when 
different policies are enforced at the same moment, one may nullify another and the result can be 
totally different from the desired outcome. Overall, the study of economic development provides the 
tools for a better understanding of the societies improvements in their context. Russia, in this line, is 
one of the best examples of a country with great development potential that has been constrained due 
to its different economic and political events. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 (Literature Review), describes the previous 
literature, which provides the solid bases of our study. Section 3 (Historical Overview) explains the 
historical  context  of  the period where our  research is  based,  providing an insight  of  the policies, 
historical and economic events that affected Russia from the 1885 until  1940. The four following 
sections constitute the core of the paper. Section 4 (Theoretical Framework), contributes to the paper 
by explaining the facts and logic behind our theoretical model. Section 5 (Methodology) presents the 
model and the main variables. Section 6 (Data) explains how the time series were constructed. In 
section 7 (Results), the main results are analyzed in order to compare them with historical events and 
the previous literature. In the last section, conclusions from our research are stated, expressing the 
applications for future researches.
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2    Related Literature
This paper is based, in many respects, on the research performed by Cheremukhin et al. (2017). The 
authors observed the effects of Stalin’s industrialization on economic growth in Russia using a two-
sector macroeconomic model. Indeed, for our study we used the production component of the labor 
wedge to define our dependent variable, in order to analyze the effects that different factors had in the 
reduction of the market markups that facilitated Russia’s rapid structural transformation. Furthermore, 
it should be mentioned that these authors used a wedge decomposition methodology, essential in our 
study, which was built on the research of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), Hunter and Szyrmer 
(2014),  but unlike them, Cheremukhin et al. (2017) studied distortions in both quantities and prices 7
and focused on sectoral reallocation. Additionally, our paper seems to indicate the assumption of the 
monopoly capitalism as main source of the distortions in the economic development during the Tsarist 
period  due  to  misallocation  of  resources  as  studied  by  Parente  and  Prescott  (1999)  and  (Alder, 
Lagakos, and Ohanian, 2012).  Furthermore, Hayashi and Prescott (2008) studied the role that labor 8
mobility restrictions played in the structural change in Japan, depressing its economic development. 
However,  as  many  academics  (Allen,  2003;  Cheremukhin  et  al.,  2017;…)  found  the  agriculture 
institutions during Imperial Russia were not the main detrimental factor for its economic growth. 
In addition, it should be mentioned that this paper is based on the economic history works by 
Robert Allen (2003), Cheremukhin et al. (2013), Davies et al. (1994) and Gregory et al. (1986). Their 
research provided most of the academic literature that supports our established hypothesis about the 
economic development and frictions in Russia, as a result of their comprehensive description of the 
institutions and policies that were enforced. Indeed, they found that: “entry barriers and monopoly 
power in the non-agricultural sector were the most important reason for Tsarist Russia’s failure to 
industrialize before WWI. On the other hand, Soviet industrial transformation after 1928 was achieved 
primarily  by  reducing  such  frictions,  albeit  coinciding  with  a  significantly  lower  performance  of 
productivity in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.”  Hence, it would be crucial to declare 9
that these academics contributed to the idea and logic behind the variables suggested in this paper, in 
an attempt to explore the causality on the reduction in the frictions deterring economic development. 
Nonetheless, the main difference between Allen (2003) and Cheremukhin et al. (2017)  is that the first 
specified  the  laws  of  motion  for  various  economic  variables  and  constructed  counterfactuals  by 
changing  the  exogenous  parameters.  The  others,  instead,  measured  both  theoretically  and 
quantitatively the wedges (frictions) and estimated their impact in a general equilibrium model in 
which consumers make their decisions optimally, subject to those distortions. Thus, their methodology 
 Similarly, these scholars evaluated Stalin’s economic policies in 1928–1940 using a multi-sector and multi-period linear model.7
 (Alder, Lagakos, and Ohanian) studied the role that monopolies and entry barriers played in the decline of the U.S. Rust Belt.8
 As declared by Cheremukhin et al. (2017)9
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not only allowed to establish the inefficiency in Soviet industrialization but also how alterations in 
these wedges played an important role in structural transformation. Although this paper focuses on 
developing further what caused the most significant frictions, the production component of the labor 
wedge, to change. Besides, Gerschenkron (1965)  and Kahan (1967) also provide an insight about the 10
agricultural and government policies implemented during the Tsarist Russia. Nevertheless, it should be 
mentioned that Gerschenkron (1952, 1963) and McCaffray (1993) contributed to our research with his 
historical research about the world’s largest country. Particularly, McCaffray (1993) pictures from a 
wide array of sources to reveal the intellectual, cultural, and social underpinnings of Russia's early 
industrialization. Representing nearly sixty firms responsible for most of the south's coal and steel 
production,  the  middle-class  men  who  ran  tsarist  Russia's  coal  and  steel  industry  composed  a 
substantial portion of Russia's technical intelligentsia.
Additionally, Banerjee & Russell (2002) contributed to the general framework with their study 
on how inflation influenced the markups. Likewise, Lozovsky (1920) and Gordon (1941) displayed the 
role,  power  and  influence  that  the  Worker  Unions  had,  from tsar  Nikolay  II  to  Stalin,  being  an 
important barrier of entry in the economic theory. The role that education plays in the process of 
structural change is suggested by Barro (1991), Allen (2003) and Galor and Moav (2006), where the 
last scholars analyzed the role of education in the industrialization in England.
However, this paper builds on historical accounts and data in Allen (2003), Gregory (1986), 
Davies  (1994),  Markevich  et  al.  (2011),  Drummond  (1976),  Gregory  &  Sailors  (1976)  and  the 
Istoricheskiye  Materialny.  These  studies  have  allowed  this  research  to  estimate  the  lacking  data, 
adjusting it to the historical context and obtain the needed proxies.
 Thus,  similarly  to  Allen  (2003)  and  Cheremukhin  et  al.  (2017)  this  paper  finds  that  the 
investment strategy policies enforced by the Soviet government, high output targets and soft budget 
constraints, were the main causes for the reduction in the production process frictions. 
 
3    Historical Overview
The aim of the following paragraphs is to provide a pithy compendium of the main events of Russian 
history,  the  essential  features  of  the  economy,  and the  most  important  policies  from the  reign of 
Nikolay II to Yosif Stalin, including the patterns of growth in Russia. 
Firstly, it should be noted albeit the study in this period is concentrated between 1885 and 
1940, this section will commence at 1854 in order to provide a more detailed historical panorama. As a 
matter  of  fact,  the  outcome of  the  Crimean war  (1854-1856),  initiated  under  Tsar  Nikolay I  and 
 Alexander Gerschenkron proposed the idea of Relative Backwardness: when the gap increases between the economic potential of a nation 10
and its’ economic reality, tension is created and new institutions are substituted for missing preconditions, and a spurt of industrial growth 
occurs. 
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finished under Tsar Aleksandr II (1855-1881), offered a vision to real situation in Russia. It recognized 
the potential dangers of the growing inequality with the West, resulting in a resurgence of the interest 
in promoting industrialization (Gregory, 1982). One attempt towards this direction was the abolition of 
serfdom  in 1861, where the serfs gained the rights  of full  citizens in exchange for redemption 11 12
payments (such as government bonds). Nonetheless, the land, known as "allotment land", was given to 
the obshchiny  rather than transferred to private households. Actually, individual peasants would have 13
rights to strips of land that were assigned to them under the open field system. Unfortunately, a peasant 
could not sell or mortgage his land, so in practice he could not renounce his rights to his land and thus 
he would be required to pay his share of redemption dues to the village commune. Moreover, the 
peasants were not given enough land to provide their needs. Hence, in words of Allen (2003): “This 
policy slowed economic growth by reinforcing communal ownership, preventing the emergence of a 
labor market, and by reducing the demand for manufactures since self-sufficient peasants bought few 
commodities”.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  some  researches  suggested  that  peasants  were  significantly 
overcharged for their land.  Tsar Aleksandr II also proceeded with profound reforms, in an attempt to 14
avoid depending on land aristocracy, and made an effort to foster Russia's industrial development and 
natural resources, by incentivizing the construction of the rail network. Indeed, under his reign, the 
Imperator assembled 984 km of railroads per year.
Nonetheless, in 1881, the Tsar was assassinated by revolutionaries. His son, Tsar Aleksandr III 
succeeded his father in the throne (1881-1894), initiating a reign of counter-reforms, strengthening the 
security police (Okhrana ), by awarding it with extraordinary powers (Gordon, 1941). In addition, the 15
Autocrat of All the Russias reversed some of the enlightened reforms of his father, remarking his 
autocracy. However, some liberal financial reforms were introduced, in an attempt to ameliorate the 
poor living conditions of the peasantry. One of these reforms was the abolition of the Poll Tax, in order 
to accelerate the legal transfer of the land allotted to peasants by the abolition of serfdom. Moreover, 
the Royal lands became available for leasing or acquisition on favorable terms (Van der Kiste, 2003). 
Nonetheless, the Imperator also contributed to the development of the railroad network, increasing the 
extension built by 1154 km per annum. 
From 1887 until 1892, Ivan A. Vyshnegradsky  was Russia’s Finance Minister, pursuing a 16
policy aimed at the balancement of the budget deficit. Indeed, Russia’s Finance Minister advocated for 
 20 million of privately held serfs were involved. 11
 Such as: right to marry without having the consent, to own property and to own a business12
 Rus: общины , plural form of the word Obshchina, Rus: общинa13
 (Gerschenkron, 1965) 14
  Rus: Охрана. Trans: Secret Police force of the Russian Empire, formed to combat terrorism and left-wing revolutionary activity.15 15
 Ivan Alexeyevich Vyshnegradsky (in Rus.: Иван Алексеевич Вышнеградский), 1832, Vyshny Volochyok-1895, St. Petersburg. 16
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a stronger intervention of the government in private railways, along with the nationalization of the 
least  profitable  companies  and segments.  Moreover  during his  ministry,  Vyshnegradsky supported 
economically  the  domestic  industry  and  prepared  a  monetary  reform.  Vyshnegradsky  achieved  a 
balanced  budget  by  increasing  direct  taxes  and  accumulating  gold  reserves  that  strengthened  the 
rouble,  but  the  increase  in  taxes  worsened  the  conditions  for  the  peasantry  (Stepanov,  1996). 
Furthermore,  Vyshnegradsky  established  the  Mendeleev  tariff  in  1891,  which  was  levied  on 
agricultural  imports,  channeling  the  gains  towards  the  industry,  the  railroads  and  the  budget  by 
limiting the international competition of the Wheat Boom. 
In 1894, Alexander III was succeeded by his son, Nikolay II, who was committed to retaining 
the autocracy that his father had left him. Under his reign the industrialization of Russia began to 
become influentially significant, however the country remained rural. Indeed, in the late 19th-early 
20th century the Russian economy was much more agricultural than economies of other countries at 
similar stages of development (Allen,  2003).  The resurgence of interest  in promoting the Russian 
Industrialization  became  specially  true  under  Count  Sergey  Witte ,  who  was  the  13th  Finance 17
Minister (1892-1903) and the First Prime Minister of the Russian Empire (1905-1906). Indeed, the 
railways network expanded 1942 km per annum until 1917, being built solely in 1899 and 1915 the 
amount of 5297 km and 5414 kilometers of railroads respectively. 
This new expanding transportation network helped to internationalize the resources of the 
Empire.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Russian  growth  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  was  caused  by  the 
combination of the railroad expansion, the increases in agricultural productivity and the integration of 
the world economy. Cultivation was expanded to the steppes of the south of Russia and extended into 
western  Siberia.  Nonetheless,  the  speed  of  industrialization  was  not  fast  enough  to  provide  the 
structural  change of the economy (von Laue,  1963).   Rising prices of  food offset  the increase in 
income of the factories, railroad and, construction workers caused by the wheat boom (Allen, 2003). 
In addition, at the countryside the rental prices of land also rose, hence the way to benefit from the 
wheat boom was by land tenure, but most peasant-owned farmland in the Empire was held by the 
obshchiny. Thus, even if the peasants were doing better they were still poor. As a Finance Minister, 
Count Witte also followed a conservative monetary policy that stabilized the exchange rate of the 
ruble, allowing Russia to join the international gold standard in 1897 (Drummond, 1976), leading to 
an increase in investment activity and in the inflow of foreign capital. Moreover, his policies also 
aimed  to  promote  the  expansion  of  domestic  heavy  industry  by  pursuing  an  aggressive  Import 
 Count  Sergey  Yulyevich  Witte  (Rus.:  Серге́й  Ю́льевич  Ви́тте),  (29  June   1849  –  13  March   1915),  was  a  highly  influential 17
econometrician,  Finance Minister, and the First Prime minister in Imperial Russia. He became one of the key figures in the political arena at 
the end of 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century. He has been described as the great reforming finance minister of the 1890s, as one 
of Nicholas's most enlightened ministers, and the architect of Russia's new parliamentary order in 1905.
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Substitution  . This protectionist trade policy included the implementation of high protective tariffs, 18 19
profit guarantees, tax reductions and exemptions. Tariffs on most industrial goods were high from the 
1880s to WWI, where Russian prices exceeded world prices by a premium that remained stable for 
most commodities (Allen, 2003). Thus, higher prices for manufactured consumer goods contributed to 
stagnate real wages. In addition, the consequences of the applied policies created a very rapid rate of 
concentration  of  production.  Powerful  monopolies  (sindikaty)  were  formed,  and  these  trends  in 
economic organization, in turn, had a significant, if not decisive, impact upon the direction and tempo 
of development. The sindikaty started to dominate most industries such as iron, steel, oil, coal, and 
railway engineering.  Henceforth,  the size of  Russian industry at  the end of  the 19th century was 
relatively small with significant barriers to entry and widespread monopolies (Cheremukhin et al., 
2017). However, by 1900 the manufacturing industry growth had been four times faster than in the 
preceding five-year period, and six times faster than in the decade before. In section 5.3 the big role 
that the sindikaty had in deterring Russia’s structural change is further explained. 
After the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), an incident called as the “Bloody 
Sunday”  occurred. In response, the Russian masses were so furious over the massacre that a general 20
strike was declared demanding a democratic republic. This historical event established the beginning 
of the 1905’s Revolution . Russia was paralyzed, and the government desperate. All political groups 21
participated  in  the  revolution,  including  the  Orthodox  clergy  (Maureen,  1972).  This  first  major 
revolution was caused (Conroy, 2006), in first place, by the poverty of the peasantry, who earned too 
little and were not allowed to sell or mortgage their allotted land. In second place the “Russification” 
policy of the government through discrimination . Moreover, the nascent industrial working class 22
opposed the government for banning strikes and labor unions (Gordon, 1941). Finally, the new ideas 
such as socialism, anarchism and liberalism opposed the archaic social institutions of the Empire, 
generating the ideological seed that would trigger the following revolutions.
In the aftermath of the Revolution, the government recognized the problems and presented 
some timid reforms, consisting in the creation of a consultive parliament (Imperial Duma) elected via 
a democratic franchise; granting of civil liberties; a cabinet government; and a 'constitutional order’. 
 In 1889, he published a paper titled "National Savings and Friedrich List", which cited the economic theories from Friedrich List. 18
 Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) is an economic and trade policy aimed to replace foreign imports with domestic production.19
 Father Grigori Gapon led an enormous crowd to the Winter Palace in, at the time, Petrograd to present a petition to the Tsar. When the 20
procession reached the palace, soldiers opened fire on the crowd, killing hundreds.
 On 9 October 1905 Witte told 'with brutal frankness' the Tsar that the country was on the verge of a catastrophic revolution, which he said 21
'would sweep away a thousand years of history'. He presented the Tsar with two choices: either appoint a military dictator, or agree to broad 
and major reforms.
 They were banned from serving in the Imperial Guard or Navy, voting and limited attendance in schools.22
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In addition, in 1906, Pyotr A. Stolypin  became the 3rd Prime Minister of Russia (1906—1911). 23
Under his  ministry Stolypin issued a series  of  decrees and undertook a new Land Reform, in an 
attempt to undermine the obshchiny by allowing individual sales of land and encouraging the peasants 
to convert  land from communal to hereditary tenure,  and to exchange their scattered strips in the 
village fields for consolidated and enclosed farms, facilitating the exit from the repartition communes 
(Castañeda & Markevich, 2013).  Nonetheless,  Stolypin was assassinated in 1911, and his reforms 
could not be implemented completely. However, Cheremukhin et al. (2017) argue that “the role of 
communes  in  Russia’s  agriculture  should  not  be  overestimated,  since  according  to  the  Land 
Ownership Statistics (Central Statistical Committee of the Interior Ministry, 1907, pp. 11), in 1905, 39 
percent of land was owned by the government, and 26 percent were in private ownership (i.e. owned 
by landlords);  the  communes  accounted for  only  35 percent  of  total  land,  or  58 percent  of  non-
government land.” Indeed,  according to Allen (2003),  Stolypin reforms had a noticeable effect  in 
weakening the communes, since the proportion of peasant in communes declined from 71 percent in 
1905 to 61 percent in 1915 (involving a migration of 2.5 million of peasant leaving the obshchiny). In 
addition  to  these  results,  the  reforms  also  increased  the  agriculture  productivity  by  14  percent 
nationwide, 25 percent in Siberia. In fact, Russia’s grain exports in 1912 exceeded by 30 percent those 
of Argentina, US and Canada combined. Indeed, Castañeda & Markevich (2013) found a large positive 
effect of land consolidations on agricultural productivity. In 1820, Russian income per head was $749 
(1990 dollars),  which was on a par with the less developed countries of Asia and Latin America, 
significantly behind western Europe. Nonetheless, it made some progress, and by 1913 its income had 
risen to $1488 per head. However, the West was a moving target and, on a percentage basis, Russia 
was farther behind in 1913 that it had been in 1820 (Cheremukhin et al., 2017). Furthermore, by 1913 
railroad expansion had ran off of steam as an engine of growth. After Stolypin, Vladimir Kokovtsov 
became the 4th Prime Minister.
In August 1914, Imperator  Nikolay II started the mobilization of the troops in defense of 
Serbia against Austria. Later on, the system of European alliances would provoke the outbreak of 
WWI.  Military  reversals  and  shortages  among  the  civilian  population  soon  soured  much  of  the 
population. By the middle of 1915, agricultural output decreased drastically, since the peasants left to 
the front,  and inflation exploded. Consequently,  strikes rose among low-paid factory workers,  and 
social unrest became common (Markevich & Harrison, 2011). Eventually, the Russian Empire was 
overthrown  before  the  WWI  ended.  with  the  February  Revolution  in  1917.  This  revolution  was 
followed by the October Revolution by the Bolsheviks, leading to the Russian Civil War. This Civil 
 Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin (Rus.: Пётр Арка́дьевич Столы́пин) (14 April, 1862 - 18 September 1911). He became the 3rd Prime 23
Minister of Russia and simultaneously Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire.  He is considered one of the last major statesmen 
of Imperial Russia with clearly defined reforming policies. 
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conflict had an enormous effect on the country and finished in 1922 with the Communist Victory. 
Overall, Russia's Great War and Civil War led to economic disaster and demographic tragedy.
With the outbreak of the Russian Civil War, Russia was divided in two differentiated zones 
controlled by the White Army or the Red Army (Bolsheviky). The territory in hands of the proletarian 
army applied what would be known as War Communism (1917-1921). Under this economic regime, 
Lenin decreed the nationalization of all the land, transferring its use to the peasantry. Moreover the 
reforms  of  Stolypin  were  reversed  and  the  open  fields  were  reassembled  and  regained  by  the 
communes (Allen, 2003). Economic problems became particularly serious due to the Civil War, grain 
requisitions and the disruption of the commercial patterns reduced the incentives to sow. Consequently 
when nature struck, the famine of 1921 that killed millions was the result. As a consequence of the 
conflicts  and  the  economic  policy,  the  urban  economy  almost  vanished  for  good.  The  industrial 
workforce fell from 2.6 millions in 1917 to 1.2 in 1920. In 1926, the peasantry accounted for the 82 
percent of the Russian population in comparison to the 72 percent in 1913 (Davies, 1990).  In 1919, 
the communist government issued a nationalization decree where large-scale firms, first,  and then, 
small-scale and workshops were taken under state control. Later on, in 1921, the economy was torn 
apart, the Bolsheviks were in control of the whole country and hyperinflation was rampant. Davies 
(1990) accounted that the the grain output was 56 percent below its 1913 level, livestock 73 percent 
down and industrial production had dropped 70 percent. As a consequence of the hard economic times, 
Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy  (1921-1928). In this new economic approach the Soviets 24
changed the requisitioning of food for moderate taxation, factory industry was put on commercial 
basis and organized as profit-maximizing trusts, private trade was legalized, and economic exchanges 
between peasants, urban residents, and industry were conducted as market transactions (Allen, 2003). 
In addition a monetary reform was introduced where the chervonets were introduced, a new currency 
backed  by  the  gold  standard,  bringing  stability  a  effectively  cutting  the  rampant  hyperinflation 
(Drummond, 1976). Industry and agriculture recovered and, at the end of the 1920’s, output was at its 
1913 level. Nevertheless, the renewed communes of the NEP (communists saw communal property 
with good eyes) had the capacity to constrain farm size growth by limiting the capacity to achieve 
economies of scale and achieving a mechanization of the Russia fields.25
In 1924, Lenin died and a battle for the power arose. Yosif Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev took 
the control of the Communist party against the party’s left-wing, led by Leon Trotsky, right-wing, led 
by Bukharin and the own members of the triumvirate (Kamenev and Zinoviev). In 1928, Yosif Stalin 
replaced the NEP for a centralized planned economy applied through 5-Year Economic Plans, that 
 NEP , Novaya Ekonomichyeskaya Politika (Rus.: Новая экономическая политика). Economic system proposed by Vladimir Lenin 24
following Karl Marx’s precepts that a nation must first reach "full maturation of capitalism as the precondition for socialist realization.
 “This has been a common pattern in developing countries during their Green Revolution and it would have been the fate for the Russian 25
farmers had the 1917 revolution not overturned the Stolypin reforms “ (Allen, 2003).
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dictated the economic strategy that the country’s economy had to follow. The institution in charge of 
carrying out the application of the economic objectives was the Gosplan.
In fact,  during the first  three 5-Year Plans (1928-1940),  economic development was quite 
rapid, industrial output increased 11% per year and GDP grew at a 5.3 percent per annum (Allen, 
2003). Indeed, during the pre-WWII Stalinism, a Prices Scissors Policy was enforced. This policy 
consisted in giving grain procurement quotas below market prices and selling them at the city above 
market prices in order to fund the heavy-industry investment (Allen, 2003). The burden fell on the 
back of the more prosperous peasants, the kulaks.  At the beginning of the 1930s, Stalin sought to 
prohibit private markets of agriculture products and to socialize the livestock. Moreover, all members 
of the peasantry were forced to join the recent formed Kolkhoz (collective farms).  This policy was 26
known as Collectivization,  and provoked the agricultural  production to plummet (Gregory,  1982). 
Creating,  as  a  consequence,  the  harsh  famine  of  1932-1933.  The  famine  and  the  reduction  in 
agricultural income inflow also caused a massive migration from the countryside to the city. However 
it should be mentioned that the levels of production, in per capita terms, were still higher than the 
levels of the 19th century (Allen, 2003). Since total agricultural output exceeded subsistence needs, 
the increase in mortality could be avoided. In addition to the agrarian collectivization, industrialization 
through the investment of the heavy-industry and manufacturing production was sought. During the 5-
Year  Plans,  the  government  nationalized  trade  and  introduced  price  control  (Cheremukhin  et  al., 
2013). Particularly, each 5-Year plan dealt with all aspects of development, although the emphasis 
varied from plan to plan, generally, the main focus resided on energy, capital goods, and agriculture. It 
should be important to notice the importance of the abundant credit from the Gosbank, since Soviet 
SOEs had the objective to maximize output rather than profits (this topic is further analyzed in section 
5.3). As a matter of fact, the production objectives were rarely met, but provided the base for the 
industrialization of the USSR through labor-hiring. Indeed, the theoretical framework developed by 
Cheremukhin et al. (2017) acknowledges this historical events as the following section will explain, 
being a useful mechanism for the study of frictions in economic history and growth.
4   Theoretical Framework
In this section, the framework that gives logic to our model and research will be explained. First, it 
should  be  stated  that  a  distortion  is  any  departure  from the  ideal  of  perfect  competition,  which 
therefore  interferes  with  economic  agents.  In  equilibrium,  with  perfect  competition  and  no 
externalities, there is no distortion in the supply and demand, thus price would equal marginal cost for 
 The dekulakization campaign of 1929-1931 affected around six million peasants where the most prosperous and  learned peasants were 26
expropriated, exiled to Siberia or executed (Davies et al., 1994, p. 68).
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each firm and product. In the opposite case, the reallocation of resources across sectors may be slowed 
by frictions which in turn may be affected by institutions and policies.
Indeed, the wedge accounting methodology allows us to identify the types of frictions and 
economic mechanisms that have the largest quantitative impact on the Tsarist and Soviet economic 
development during the studied period. The main identity in the wedge accounting methodology is 
(Cheremukhin et al., 2017):
                                              
where U is the marginal utility for agriculture (   ) or manufacturing (   ), F is the marginal products 
of  labor  in  the  two  sectors  and     and     are  the  relative  prices  and  wages.  Thus,  as 
previously  stated,  in  perfect  competition  and  the  absence  of  frictions,  or  distortions,  the  three 
components  on the  right  hand side  would be  equal  to  one.  The first  term of  the  right  hand side 
corresponds to the consumption component. This term captures the frictions in consumer markets, 
such as poor integration of product markets. On the other hand, the frictions in the production process, 
due to the existence of monopoly power or barriers to entry, lays in the middle of the right hand side of 
the equation. Finally, the term composed by the relative wages corresponds to the mobility component. 
This term maps the distortions in the labor market, such as costly human capital acquisition or barriers 
to labor mobility (i.e.: obshchiny). Cheremukhin et al. (2017) determined that, for this decomposition 
in Russia between the period 1885-1940 (logically, the same studied period), the main driver of the 
wedges was the production component, and not the the other intersectoral mobility or consumption 
components. Moreover, they demonstrated that the reduction in the production component accounts 
for the majority of the industrialization that happened during Stalin’s rule. 
Later on, the authors built on the Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentiyi (2013)’s neoclassical 
growth model three wedges corresponding to the three optimality conditions on the intersectoral and 
intertemporal allocation of resources. Being the intersectoral labor wedge:
!                                                             !  
where  term    is  the  wedge  accounting  for  the  deviations  of  labor  between  sectors  (measuring 
structural change through frictions between the two sectors of the economy). However, this definition 
depended only on quantities and the wedges can be further decomposed in prices, where    is the price 
of a good fabricated in a determined sector i, and    is the wage earned in a sector i. The sector i can 
either be Agriculture or Manufacturing. Hence, (2) can be rewritten as a product of the three terms in 
(1):
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As previously, the first component on the right hand side is the optimality condition of consumers and 
the term composed by relative wages is the mobility component. The component in the middle of the 
right hand side of the equation is the production component in the optimality condition of competitive 
price-taking firms. The Production Wedge, represents the market frictions in the production process. 
When the values of the wedges are not equal to one, is a symptom of economic policies or institutions 
preventing  an  efficient  allocation  of  resources  or  economic  structure  that  does  not  work  as  in  a 
prototype growth model. The production wedge was the most significant one, accounting for the 70% 
of the labor wedge variability in the work of Cheremukhin et al. (2017).
As stated before, this method allowed Cheremukhin et al. (2017) to analyze the source of the 
barriers that impeded the structural transformation of Russia. Particularly, the authors attempted to 
explain the effect  of  monopoly capitalism. Consequently,  they assumed that  each company in the 
manufacturing sector was price-taker in the goods market and a monopsonist in a local labor market. 
As a result, the labor supply in the equilibrium N(w), that the monopsonist faces when setting wage w, 
is determined by free labor mobility condition between the two sectors of the economy and decreasing 
returns to scale in agriculture. Hence, this relationship is given by:
                                           
Where  is the share of labor in the agricultural sector and N is is the labor supply in equilibrium. 
Hence, a monopsonist chooses the wage rate w, in order to maximize its profit taking the labor supply 
equation  as  given,  pM·N(w)  –  w·N(w).  Consequently,  the  production  wedge,  or  the  production 
component of the labor wedge is:
                                      
This equation is a measure of the monopoly power, or the markup over the monopsonist’s marginal 
cost. Consequently, this will allow us to observe the evolution of the friction over time and through 
some estimations discover which factor, and policies contributed to diminish it.
Hence, given this model, we are able to estimate, through a econometric regression, which 
were the main causes that influenced the production wedge throughout the studied period. In the next 
section of this research, the procedure will be explained along with the considered main variables. In 
order to determine the policies and causes determining the structural change in Russia. 
5   Methodology
In this section, the empirical strategy will be explained along with the different main variables that 
may have an impact on the Production Wedge (frictions). In this way, this section will provide a better 
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understanding of the proposed study and of how the elected variables may affect the frictions that 
deterred Industrialization in Russia during Tsarism and, permitted it during Stalin’s rule. 
5.1 Empirical Strategy
This part will allow us to identify the main variables, policies and governments that have the greater 
impact on the Production Wedge. In order to do so, we specified a linear model in which the main 
variables that may have any influence are incorporated. The model is as follows:
Proposed Relationship: 
               
Initial Model: 
                                                                
The  dependent  variable  and the  main  independent  variables  are  further  explained in  this  section. 
However, the Policy Variables and the Dynastic variables will be explained in this subsection, in order 
to understand the empirical strategy that will be conducted in this research.
The  dynastic  variables  are  dummy  variables  to  control  for  the  different  governments 
throughout the the studied period and analyze the direct specific effects of those determined years. 
Consequently,  four  big  periods  will  be  analyzed.  TsarismDD,  WarCommunism and  NEPDD and 
StalinDD will be the variables created to control for these effects (DD stands for Dynastic Dummy). 
Where TsarismDD will comprise the years 1885-1916, WarCommunismDD from 1917-1922, NEPDD 
from  1922  until  1928  and,  finally,  StalinDD  will  control  for  1929-1940.  Hence,  once  the  most 
significant periods are found they will be decomposed, into smaller time packs to acknowledge the 
role of the different governments and sets of policies, which were implemented in specific years.  For 
example,  if  TsarismDD  happens  to  be  significant,  it  will  be  substituted  by  VyshnegradskyGov 
(government of Vyshnegradsky), WitteGov (government of Witte), and StolypinGov (government of 
Stolypin),  in order to observe more precisely the significance.  Again these are dummies  variables 
created for the specific years of the different governments. On the other hand, StalinDD would, at the 
same time, be divided among the three different five-year plans that were conducted consecutively 
between 1929 and 1940. War Communism and the NEP would not be further decomposed since the 
periods are already small enough. 
The policy variables refer to a set of variables that try to identify specific effects in determined 
years. For example, if we want to observe the effect of Protectionism, we would incorporate to the 
model  the  new  variable  TsarTrade,  which  has  been  constructed  by  multiplying  the  dummy  of 
TsarismDD  by  the  main  variable  of  ManImp  (Manufacturing  Imports).  Consequently,  we  would 
PWedget = f (Invest ment, In f lat ion , Educat ion , Tra de, Policies) (6)
PWedget = β0,t + β1,t Invt + β2,tlogIn f lt + β3,tDemCont + β4,tL itRatet + β5,t Man Impt
+β6,tPolic yVar iablest + β7,tD yn ast icVar iablest (7)
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observe  the  effect  of  the  evolution  of  the  manufactured  imports  that  were  under  the  Import 
Substitution Policy or high tariffs common throughout the period of the Russian Empire under study. 
Thus,  with  this  combination,  the  model  will  be  able  to  identify  the  source  of  the  impact 
towards the reduction of the production market frictions and consequently it would construct a bridge 
between the Economic History literature and Economic Growth Theory.
5.2 Production Wedge
The Production Wedge represents market frictions in the production process. Consequently, it allows 
us to observe how the policies permitted or deterred industrialization due to the existence of barriers of 
entry in the market or monopoly power. During the Russian Empire the frictions to the allocation of 
production factors between sectors were very high. The production component of the labor wedge 
accounted for half of the overall wedge.  Consequently, this would mean that during the Russian 27
Empire  there  was  a  severe  underutilization  of  labor  in  the  non-agricultural  sector.  It  should  be 
mentioned that the optimal value of a wedge should be 1,  i.e. what it would be in the absence of 
frictions.  However,  the  mean  between  1885-1917  is  3.29,  indicating  a  highly  distorted  system. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  possible to observe differences during the different  governments for  the whole 
period. As a consequence, an interesting insight arises: the Government of Sergei Witte had on average 
the higher values of distortion (with Stolypin really close) of the whole analyzed Tsarist period and 
Vyshnegradsky the lowest. Nonetheless, none of these averaged values was below 3, indicating overall 
a huge impediment in the industrialization of Russia. These facts are consistent with the literature 
regarding monopoly capitalism, the sindikaty, and the administrative barriers to create and manage 
independently companies and firms. Hence,  it can explain the low share of manufacturing production 
in the Russian Empire. In addition, Cheremukhin et al. (2017) state that the total wage bill was less 
than 20 per cent of the total factory value added, since Gregory (1982) reported: “the added value in 
factories was three billion rubles of 1913; factories employed two million people and factory surveys 
during the Tsarist period showed that the average annual wage in factories was 257 rubles in 1913.”
During the War period, the production wedges increased drastically due to the official decrees 
to mobilize the production towards guns and weapons and the destruction caused by the war. Another 
important factor would be the effect of War Communism, in which collectivization, nationalization 
and expropriation were the most common traits. Later on, during the NEP, the production wedges 
started to trend down in a glacial pace, although they were still peaks. Consequently this resulted in 
substantial drops in total factor productivity in both the manufacturing and the agricultural sector. In 
this peaking period, could also be incorporated the first years of Stalins industrialization plans. The 
logic  laying  behind  would  be  the  hectic  and  violent  imposition  of  expropriation  to  the  peasants 
 Cheremukhin et al (2017).27
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through the initial years of Collectivization of land along with the Price Scissors Policy. These policies 
resulted, overall, in a substantial decrease in agricultural productivity, and consequently in a famine 
(Holodomor).  Nevertheless,  during  this  time  the  production  frictions  started  to  diminish  rapidly, 
reaching in 1930-1931 the lowest value since 1885 (in the middle of the first five-year plan). In 1935, 
the  wages  had  stabilized  around  the  value  1.21.  “This  meant  that  the  Agricultural  TFP  and 
Manufacturing  TFP increased  back  to  the  long-run  trends,  but  manufacturing  laid  considerably 
beneath the trend.” Cheremukhin et al. (2017).
5.3 Investment
In the Tsarist period, firms operated under a capitalist logic, meaning that firms attempted to maximize 
profits and reduce costs. Nonetheless, at that time, Russia had an incipient private sector in which 
development was mainly induced by state  promotion and direction.  Indeed the state  provided the 
demand  for  manufactured  products  through  its  railroad  expansion  agenda.  Gerschenkron  (1965) 
stated: “Russia was not so much demand-constrained, and therefore, in need of a substitute market as 
it was constrained by institutions and policies.” An example of this statement would be the restraints 
on ownership and activities that were imposed on the charters granted, meaning that the fate of the 
firms would depend significantly on the state support. This fate was even more sealed, due to the fact 
that international markets were not excessively developed to grant the investment that the Russian 
companies  needed.  Furthermore,  when  Sergei  Witte  pegged  the  ruble  to  the  gold  standard,  the 
implemented Import Substitution Policy impeded further a better funding. As a matter of fact Allen 
(2003) brought an interesting insight by stating: “Imperial Policy was not based on the public interest. 
Instead the state manipulated private firms to such degree that the possibility of spontaneous growth 
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was frustrated.” Economic historians and Institutional Economists have proven and emphasized the 
role that well-defined property rights along with a stable legal environment may play in promoting 
investment and, as a direct consequence, capitalist economic growth. It may also be said that these 
characteristics during this period of Russia were not a mere result of fortune, but a direct ideological 
intervention  due  to  an  intense  and  long-standing  anticapitalist  and  pro-autocracy  ideas  of  the 
Imperator.  This  prejudice against  capitalism frustrated the entrepreneurship  that  typically  emerges 
from a Western commercial society. It would be also important to mention that Sergei Witte sought the 
industrialization  of  Russia,  however  it  was  Stolypin  who attempted to  modernize  it  before  being 
assassinated. Hence as Cheremukhin et al. (2017) argued this monopolistic power led to an inefficient 
low  demand  for  capital  and  labor  in  the  manufacturing  sector  and  a  low  investment  in  the 
manufacturing sector. Even though, Russia’s main characteristic was the improving investment rate (a 
typical developing country trait) throughout the Tsarist era. This increase was aimed to expand the 
railroad in order to provide the grain to the world. Wheat was the engine of growth of Russia during 
that time. However, the manufacturing sector had no incentives to expand and hire new labor since 
they enjoyed granted subsidized profits from the state, sindikaty.
Later on, due to the WWI, regions that were already industrialized, like Poland or Finland, 
gained their independence and separated from the Empire, diminishing the industrialized zones that 
the Russian Empire had.  In addition, the war devastated the border regions of European Russia, 28
which were at the same time the most economically developed. Nonetheless it should be said that 
before  the  devastation,  investment  moved  towards  guns  and  weapons  drastically.  The  situation 
worsened due to the Russian Civil War, which affected every inhabited province of the Empire. The 
outcome was  disastrous,  and  even  more  profound  when  the  victors,  the  Bolsheviky,  applied  War 
Communism. The investment during that time returned to levels previous to 1905. Indeed, in 1920, the 
USSR was a traditional underdeveloped country (Allen, 2003). However in 1921 with the introduction 
of the NEP, whilst large-scale industry remained under direct control of the government, small-scale 
was  allowed  to  be  in  private  ownership.  The  NEP sought  investment  in  machinery  to  improve 
productivity, and it also resulted in experts from different industrial fields being called upon to advice 
on efficiency and improvements. Indeed in 1928, investment returned to prewar levels. However the 
NEP SOEs operated on commercial  basis,  what did not allow “socially profitable” (not economic 
efficient) investments. As a matter of fact, this changed under Yosif Stalin’s rule. Stalin’s system of 
economic  organization  had  two  advantages  in  comparison  to  capitalist-operated  firms.  First,  in 
deciding on investments, capitalist firms analyzed their own profits and ignored the externalities that 
their activity and investments had for other firms in the economy if they did not benefit them too 
(companies main objective is to maximize their profits). Hence, socially profitable investments would 
 Nonetheless, they have not been taken into account in our analysis since they distorted the effects of the war. 28
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not be undertaken. Second, following the previous logic, capitalist companies would solely hire new 
workers if  they would generate revenue enough to cover their  salaries,  that  is  when the marginal 
product was greater than their marginal cost or wage. Nonetheless, in the Soviet Union output could be 
augmented by contracting new workers with positive marginal product even if it was less than the 
wage (or the marginal cost). Thus, the state-owned enterprises main objective would be to maximize 
output rather than profits (imposed during the 5-year plans by the production objectives), resulting in 
through-employment expansion growth, but at really inefficient rates and outputs. In fact, the system 
was funded by the Gosbank. It offered really abundant credit, that the SOE borrowed since they had 
soft-budget constraints (contrary to restraining budget constraints) in order to achieve the ambitious 
production  objectives  settled  by  the  Gosplan.  Hence  the  SOE  expanded  production  through 
investment, but, as the TPFs  shown, at a very inefficient rate.29
5.4 Inflation
Price  changes,  or  the  lack  thereof,  were  an  important  factor  in  determining  living  standards  and 
influencing politics throughout the history of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Soviet Union was created 
and dissolved in the midst of high inflation. In the first case, the Bolsheviks took over after high food 
prices helped bring down the Tsarist and Republican governments. However, their initial policies led 
to Russia’s first hyperinflation and domestic unrest, so they had to stabilize the ruble and the economy 
in order to remain in power. After Stalin took charge, the Soviet economy struggled with inflation for 
 Cheremukhin et al. (2017)29
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two decades, until the 1947 currency reform finally established a monetary system based on fixed 
prices. Although price controls prevented inflation, they also created persistent shortages of food and 
consumer goods, which were the most common complaints about the economy by Soviet citizens 
(Efremov, 2012). 
The Russian monetary and fiscal policy during the last decade of the nineteenth century made 
a positive contribution to the industrialization of the country, since Russia’s currency was pegged to 
the Gold Standard from 1897 to 1913. This exchange rate imposed costs since it obliged the state to 
use resources for the provision of gold coin, gold reserves, and relatively low-yielding reserves of 
foreign exchange. On the other hand, by adopting the gold standard the state may had improved the 
connections between the Russian and Western capital  markets,  allowing Russian governments and 
private  borrowers  to  obtain  funds  more  plentifully,  more  cheaply,  or  both  (Drummond,  1976). 
International comparisons for the year 1913 reveal that domestic savings proportions in Russia were 
quite high for a low per capita incomes country (over 9 percent of the net national product, NNP). 
Indeed, only wealthy nations as Germany, U.K., and U.S. had higher domestic savings proportions 
than Russia. Actually, the German and the U.S. investment rates were the only ones that exceeded 
those of Russia in 1913. Whether these high domestic and foreign savings rates can be attributed to the 
Witte System cannot be determined with certainty, however, in the absence of an alternative viable 
explanation, the probability is relatively high (Gregory & Sailors, 1976).
Inflation first started in the Russian Empire during the First World War and led to higher food 
prices in the cities, which were major factor in creating urban discontent and bringing down both the 
imperial and republican governments.  However,  when the Bolsheviks took over,  they made living 
conditions  even  worse  by  trying  to  create  a  moneyless  economy.  This  attempt,  known  as  War 
Communism, created hyperinflation, a major famine, shortages of goods, and rebellions by peasants 
and sailors. The hyperinflation connoted a seven-year period of uncontrollable spiraling inflation until 
the reestablishment of the gold standard with the introduction of the chervonets, where they managed 
to stabilize the ruble, also by balancing their budget. The economy made an astounding recovery in the 
1920s under the New Economic Policy, but industrial prices rose much faster than agricultural prices 
in  the open market.  As a  consequence,  the  Bolshevik leaders  responded by crowding out  private 
merchants  and  re-imposing  price  controls.  They  also  continued  the  Price  Scissors  policy,  which 
consisted in purchasing grain from the peasants at artificially low rates and selling it at a higher ones. 
These  factors  inspired  the  decision  to  proceed  with  full-scale  state  industrialization  and 
collectivization.  During  the  Stalin  years,  the  Russian  economy had different  types  of  stores  with 
varying degrees of price controls and inflation. Strict price controls were in place in most state stores 
and co-operatives, while others were allowed to sell at higher regulated rates. While these stores had 
low prices, they also suffered shortages and a poor selection of products. In contrast, collective farm 
markets were completely free to set their prices according to market forces,  but their prices were 
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usually much higher. As mentioned before, it would not be until 1944 when inflation started to decline 
after the Soviet government balanced its budget, and it was completely eliminated after the currency 
reform of 1947. 
5.5 Demographic Shocks
Demographic shocks created by famines or wars have been common throughout the history of Russia, 
sometimes these features have led to economic instability, social unrest and political crisis. Generally, 
these periods of extreme violence, aggression, destruction and mortality have huge implications for the 
country’s society and, as a consequence, for the economy. It is well known that there is a relationship 
between the population and the economic growth (Peterson et al., 2017). A war can strike against the 
most prepared people of a country, or it can make an economic or social system collapse. Moreover, it 
can also affect the different sectors of an economy creating a scarcity of labour supply. Indeed, in 
1891-1892, during the last years of Vyshnegradsky’s government, a famine occurred starting in the 
Volga river. This famine caused 425,000 deaths, reduced the production of cereals, and induced into a 
negative budget  balance.  Moreover,  the famine reactivated the populists  and marxists.  This social 
unrest blooming can be traced back to the public’s anger at the Tsarist government’s management.
 Later on, the tumultuous and agonizing transformation of the Russian Empire and the USSR 
on the first half of 1900s brought about dramatic changes in the structure of the economy. In 1905, a 
wave of massive political and social unrest spread through the Russian Empire. This Revolution was 
the  first  big  political  revolution  in  the  Russian  Empire,  and  the  precedent  of  the  1917  one, 
consequently it would be expected to observe distorted output and influenced market frictions through 
the restriction of food availability (relative wages). 
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In 1917, the February and the October Revolutions succeeded each other. As a consequence, 
the Russian Empire ceased to exist, and in 1922 the Soviet Union was formed from the Empire’s 
rubles. As Markevich & Harrison (2011) stated: “Wars and revolutions have the capacity to wreak 
havoc on modern societies. Nesting one inside the other, Russia’s Great War and Civil War led to 
economic disaster and demographic tragedy.” In fact,  the scale of losses translated into the worst 
economic disaster until the moment. The deaths amounted to around sixteen million and the civil war 
caused many skilled people to flee the lands of the former empire. There was a superabundance of 
unskilled laborers but shortages of most kinds of skilled laborers. However, the Russian economy 
suffered less in the Great War than in the Civil War (Markevich & Harrison, 2011). War deaths and 
economic devastation persisted into peacetime, and were not fully restored under the New Economic 
Policy. Simultaneously, in 1921-1922, as a result of the economic disturbance of the War communism, 
the Povolzhye Famine, which killed 5 million of people, occurred. 
The  second  biggest  demographic  shock  emerged  as  a  consequence  of  the  famine 
(Holodomor)  and the repression (Great Purge) under the rule of Yosif Stalin. Their origin was the 30
forced  industrialization  carried  out  during  the  First  Year-Plan  in  which  the  collectivization  of 
agriculture was carried out. Davies et al. (1994) concluded that “the total number of the excess deaths 
may have amounted to 8.5 million in 1927-36 […] most of the deaths took place during the 1933 
famine.” Moreover, Meng et al. (2014) gathered important evidence on the causes of famine in another 
centrally-planned economy, China, for the 1959-61 period. The two famines share a lot of similarities. 
In the two situations, there was enough food to avoid unnourishment. However, in both cases the 
policies  of  the Governments  led to  scarcity  in  the countryside.  The scholars  concluded that:  “the 
similarity of institutions and outcomes in the two economies suggests that similar mechanisms are 
likely to have led to high mortality rates in Soviet Russia in 1931-33.”
 Ukr.: Голодомо́р, derived from морити голодом, moriti golodom. (Trans.:“to kill by starvation”)30
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5.6 Education
Many recent  studies  have emphasized the importance of  education as  a  determinant  of  economic 
growth in the twentieth century (Galor & Moav, 2004; Peterson & Wesley, 2017). For example, one of 
the reasons why Latin America did not grow as rapidly as North America and Europe was the low 
literacy and education. Indeed, in 1913, the literacy rate in Russia was 39%, ranking ahead of the least 
developed Asiatic countries, but close to the last of the Latin American countries and far less than the 
developed countries (Russia 39%, Argentina 64%, Brazil 35%, US 90%) . It should be mentioned, 31
that a great advance had been made since 1886, were just the 21% was literate. Nevertheless, the 
difference was still considerable. Moreover, as Galor and Moav (2004) stated, “capital accumulation in 
the  process  of  industrialization  gradually  intensified  the  relative  scarcity  of  skilled  labour  and 
generated an incentive for human capital accumulation.” Consequently, as the literacy rates increased 
in Russia due to the reforms under the reign of Nikolay II or the Likbez program  of Lenin a higher 32
demand for skilled labor would have been observed, through the relative wages, and consequently 
gradual  industrialization by hiring new workers.  However,  it  is  expected that  the  frictions  during 
Tsarism of monopoly capitalism stopped this phenomena to happen and in the Soviet Union the firms 
would not follow the capitalistic logic, and worker’s positions would be assigned by the Gosplan.
 UNESCO; 1953,  p.55; 1957, pp. 86,  50; 1975, pp. 89, 108, 121. ; Brooks (1982).31
 Trans: Elimination of Illiteracy, Abbreviation from Likvidatsiya Bezgramotnosti,  in Rus.:  ликвида́ция  безгра́мотности.  Abbr.  in 32
Rus.:  ликбе́з.  This  program consisted  in  a  campaign  of  eradication  of  illiteracy  in  the  Soviet  Union  between  1920  and  1930,  by 
compelling people from 8 to 50 years old to be illiterate in their mother tongue.
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5.7 Tsarist Trade, Tariffs and Manufacturing Imports
Under the reign of Nikolay II,  Sergei Witte started a trade policy of Import Substitution in 1891. 
Tariffs were levied on manufactured imports in an attempt to grant that the Russian industry would 
“smelt the iron ore, roll the rails, and forge the locomotives for the country” (Allen, 2003). Indeed, 
they channeled the  demand for  railroads  and locomotives  to  Russian  producers.  Industrial  output 
shifted with producer goods comprising an unusually large share of the total, particularly the outcome 
was a ninefold increment in the output of heavy industry. However, another circumstances emerged 
with the textiles, protectionism was also applied at the raw material stage (raw cotton, iron ore…) and 
the higher prices for the manufactured goods languished real wages. Indeed, as a result of this system, 
where Russian companies were protected also from external competition (in addition to the sindikaty’s 
treats of favor), Russia closed itself in its domestic market. The future did not seem promising since 
the wheat boom was running out of steam. Indeed, the tariffs were called by Laue (1974) as “monster 
tariffs”. This name was given due to the high rate that they had from 1880, since Russian prices were 
superior to world prices by a premium that remained for most goods until the WWI. Cheremukhin et al 
(2017) argue that: “The impact was substantial: while terms of trade improved for agriculture by about 
30 percent in 1890-1913, due to tariffs retail non-agricultural prices rose so much that relative food/
non-food retail  prices did not change”. It  should be mentioned that during the time of the Soviet 
Union, the government always held the monopoly on all  foreign trade activity until  Yosif Stalin’s 
death in 1953. The Bolshevik ideology opposed to external economic control and they refused to pay 
WWI’s debts. As a consequence, trade was kept at the minimum required level. However, during the 
NEP, the regime permitted other organizations to deal directly with foreign partners. Nonetheless, with 
the first five-year plan trade was restricted once again (Socialism in One Country) to the essential, 
factory equipment for the industrialization.
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5.8 Unions
In Russia, as in every other country, the labor movement appeared with the development of capitalism. 
Pioneering strikes in Russia erupted between 1870 and 1880. However, until 1905’s Revolution there 
were no labor unions in Russia. There were societies of mutual aid, but not very numerous and their 
activities were limited by the police laws, having no influence on the labor conditions. Only in 1905 
unions were organized, and they spread rapidly on the large toiling masses, and one year after there 
were 200,000 organized workers in Russia. Reiteratively, from 1907 until 1914, the recently stablished 
unions fail to led any social pressure as a consequence of the political persecutions by the Okhrana. As 
a matter of fact, in the eve of the Revolution in 1917, in Russia, there were only three unions with a 
total membership of 1500 associates. On the morrow of the revolution, a strong factory committee 
movement had sprung up, from workers occupying workplaces or forcing their bosses into compliance 
with demands as the government would no longer protect them. However, as the Bolsheviky seized and 
consolidated power, this movement was dismantled by the nationalization of industries. Moreover, 
when the War Communism was stablished during the Russian Civil War, the trade unions ended up 
becoming governmental organizations whose objectives were to further the goals of management and 
production. They were converted to vertical unions,  involving cooperation with the employer (the 
Government)  under  the  central  organization,  Soviet  of  the  All-Russian Unions.  During the  1930s 
(Stalin’s era), the trade unions were not permitted to challenge the Party nor the Government in any 
substantial way.  Hence the Soviet unions did not fight for the economics interests of the workers, they 
rather acted as courier belts of the Party instructions, carrying punishments and rewards to industrial 
and collective farm employees. Moreover the strikes were illegal,  protecting the State monopoly’s 
power.  As a consequence, we decided not to add the Unions variable into our regression. It is well-
known that Unions interact with, and affect the markets mark-ups intensively. Nonetheless, for this 
particular case it resulted in a non-significant determinant as stablished in the historical literature.
6    Data
In  this  section,  the  construction  of  the  data  will  be  briefly  discussed.  See  Appendix  A for  a 
comprehensive description of the data resources and construction. For this research a new sequence of 
time series data has been elaborated, in order to proceed with this analysis. The main source of our 
main variables economic data is Cheremukhin et al. (2017). They obtained, at the same time, the data 
for output,  consumption and investment for Russia in 1885-1913 from Gregory (1982).  Gregory’s 
data, which was sufficiently disaggregated, allowed Cheremukhin et al. (2017) to build the investment 
time series in the manufacturing sector that it is used in our study. On the other hand they took the 
majority of their Soviet economic data from Moorsteen and Powell (1966), which is widely used by 
historians. 
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Moreover, for the missing data in the war years, Markevich and Harrison (2013) provided a 
valuable  reconstruction  of  the  data  that  has  been  also  used  in  this  research,  such  as  investment, 
population, and the industry output (later used as an instrument for the IV regression). The data on 
inflation was extracted from the researches of Drummond (1976), Efremov (2012) and, Gregory & 
Sailors (1976). We used the amount of currency in circulation as a proxy for inflation, since the levels 
of the velocity of money and backwardness in the development of financial markets in Russia offered 
a good substitute. In addition, for the Education, the literacy rate seemed a good proxy to determine 
the level of education in Russia, since following the insights of Galor and Moav (2008), the fact of 
being able to read already made the difference due to the fact that they were able to understand the 
instructions of the machines. It should be also said that we subtracted the population of Finland and 
Poland from the population of the Russian Empire, in order to minimize the impact of the war that was 
not caused by casualties and destruction. Indeed, in order to accomplish this feat, we also computed 
the population of Poland under the Russian Empire from 1885 until 1918. Hence, we further complete 
the existing time series regarding the period from 1885 to 1940, by incorporating the values of the 
missing years for WWI, the Russian Civil War and the NEP. Cheremukhin et al. (2017) stated that this 
missing  period  of  time  was  of  particular  importance  for  the  scholars  analyzing  Russia’s  history. 
Regarding the precision of the soviet figures, several studies (Allen, 2003; Davies et al., 1994) have 
concluded that the majority of these figures were reliable. However, in order to improve precision we 
obtained  the  majority  of  our  data  from  previous  research.  Moreover  we  also  interpolated,  and 
reconstructed  part  of  the  data  from  many  different  studies  guidelines  and  from  the  IstMat 
(Istoricheskiye Materialni)  and the Russian Statistics Library. This allowed us to estimate the values 33
of  the  Production  Wedge  for  the  missing  years.  In  addition,  we  tested  out  that  the  estimated  an 
interpolated data in our research matched the historical accounts, tendencies and events. For example, 
the estimations for the production evolution during the War Period were checked with the statistical 
book of Kafengaus (1994) with a satisfactory outcome. Hence in the following section, we will use the 
completed time series to analyze the effects on the frictions over time. 
7    Results
In this section, the results obtained in this research will be presented. In addition, a detailed description 
of every step will be provided. Table 1 summarizes all the results obtained in the different regressions 
that were carried out, investigating the variables that had an influence on our dependent variable.
Initial Model: 
 
                                                                   
PWedget = β0,t + β1,t Invt + β2,tlogIn f lt + β3,tDemCont + β4,tL itRatet + β5,t Man Impt
+β6,tPolic yVar iablest + β7,tD yn ast icVar iablest (7)
Russian project between economics and history professors with the aim to gather and develop the historical data for Russia33
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Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis, being the values for the coefficients the firsts in the cell. In addition, the stars 
indicate the level of confidence of the results. (Three stars mean significant at a 95% confidence level).
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 The first three columns (OLS) show the three first results of our empirical strategy (see section 5.1), 
where we attempted to test which periods and governments were significant in the reductions of the 
frictions in the production process. The last OLS regression (OLS CA) , in column 4, shows how 34
autocorrelation was solved with the incorporation of the lagged dependent variable. The last column 
shows  the  estimates  by  instrumental  variables  (IV),  robust  for  heteroskedasticity  and  no 
autocorrelation with two instruments. The importance of the IV estimates resides on the fact that the 
results will not be consistent and unbiased with the existence of endogeneity in our regression.  It 35
should be noted that the estimations with IV are consistent but not efficient, that is the reason why we 
used two strong instruments, in order to increase the efficiency of our results.
In column 1, we regressed the main variables including the dynastic variables, Tsarism and 
Stalinism. These variables highly significant, however the coefficient of Tsarism is the opposite of 
what expected from the literature.
1st OLS Model:
 
                                                                                                 
However, in the moment that the dynastic indicator variables for NEP and War Communism 
were incorporated,  Tsarism became insignificant.  Then,  the  research went  one step further  in  our 
empirical strategy. We divided the two main dynastic variables (Tsarism and Stalinism) into dynastic 
variables recognizing the smaller periods of time, determined by the different governments and set of 
policies, allowing us to get into more detail on how the different enforced policies by the different 
governments  affected the dependent  variable of  our  study.  Thus,  the new dynastic  variables  were 
incorporated to the regression along with the rest of the main variables, as it can be seen in the second 
column. In addition, since Manufactured Imports were not significant, a policy variable was created 
(TsarTrade) to check for the effect that protectionism had during the Russian Empire. It should be said 
that  although in  the  second column there  are  many variables,  it  was  also  attempted to  check by 




                                                                                                                               
The ones that maintained their significancy are written on the third column. An interesting insight, 
however, arises already from the second to the third columns. This surprising issue is that none of the 
PWedget = β0,t + β1,t Invt + β2,tl ogIn f lt + β3,t DemCont + β4,t L i t Ra tet + β5,t Ma n Im pt
+β6,tTsar i smt + β7,tS ta l in i smt (8)
PWedget = β0,t + β1,t Invt + β2,tl ogIn f lt + β3,t DemCont + β4,t L i t Ra tet + β5,tTsar T r a d et
+β6,tWar Com mt + β7,t NEPt + β9,tV ysh n eG ovt + β10,tWit teG ovt + β11,tS tolG ovt + β12,t1F YPt
+β13,t2F Y Pt + β14,t3F Y Pt (9)
 CA stands for Corrected for Autocorrelation.34
 The Hausman test for endogeneity showed that our OLS estimation was not consistent.35
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variables referring directly to Tsarism seems to be significant (except Investment).  However,  on a 
second thought this would make sense in the literature, since during Tsarist Russia, wedges were high 
and stable, due to the monopoly capitalism. As a consequence, this study could be expanded in this 
way, from previous years to 1885, to observe the formation of the latent  frictions of the Russian 
Empire. 
3rd OLS Model:
        (10)
In  column  three,  we  can  observe  how  the  variable  Investment  is  significant  across  all 
specifications.  Inflation  and  the  First  &  Second  Five-Year  Plans  (1FYP &  2FYP)  seems  to  be 
significant,  whereas  War  Communism is  not.  This  regression  explains  an  interesting  78% of  the 
variability of the production wedge. In addition, the variables, significant at a 95% level of confidence, 
have  the  sign  we would  have  expected  from the  literature.  Hence,  column three  seemed a  good 
candidate for a final model however, once it was checked for autocorrelation with the Durbin-Watson 
test, it appeared that the model followed an AR(1) . Hence, once the lagged dependent variable was 36
incorporated to the model (column 4), Inflation and the Second five-year plan ceased to be significant, 
whereas WarCommunism turned statistically  significant.  This  is  represented in column four  (OLS 
CA). 
 OLS (RA) Model:
               
Moreover, when checking for autocorrelation after the incorporation of the lagged dependent variable 
(lagPWedge), the Durbin’s H test showed that the autocorrelation problem was solved. Nonetheless, 
the  final  model  appears  in  the  column  five  (Robust  IV),  in  which  the  model  was  checked  for 
endogeneity. The variable that we are concerned with is Investment since it may be determined jointly 
with the dependent  variable (simultaneity)  or  because we may have an omitted variable which is 
correlated with this main variable.  In order to make it exogenous we introduced two instruments that 
passed all the required tests, such as the Hausman test, Under-identification, Sargan-Hansen Over-
identification  and  the  Weak  Instrument  test  (check  appendix  C).  The  instruments  used  are  the 
Manufacture  Output  from 1885-1940,  and ResIV3 .  Consequently,  the  resulting model  is  robust, 37
exogenous and consistent, allowing us to claim causal effects between the variables and the production 
wedge, and explaining the ninety-three percent of the Production Wedges variability. 
PWedget = β0,t + β1,t Invt + β2,tlogIn f lt + β3,tWarComt + β4,t1FYPt + β4,t2FYPt
PWedget = β0,t + β1,t Invt + β2,tWarComt + β3,t1FYPt + β4,tlagPWedget (11)
 Breusch-Godfrey test showed an autoregressive model of order one. The results for the different econometrical tests can be seen in the 36
Appendix C.
 The instrument ResIV is elaborated by lagging all the variables of the current model, and regressing them against the interested variable 37
(Investment), from that estimation the residuals, that are used as an instrument, are kept.
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Thus,  our  research  concludes  that  the  significant  variables  controlling  for  autocorrelation, 
endogeneity and robust for heteroskedasticity are:
Final Model (IV):
Hence from this model, it can be observed that the results are consistent with the literature. 
Investment is significant and negative, along with the First Five-Year Plan, implying that the emphasis 
in the investment strategy on heavy-industry by the imposition of high output targets in conjunction 
with the soft budget constraints were the responsible factors for the decline in the market frictions of 
the production process.  Moreover,  as Allen (2003) stated referring to trade: “exporting wheat and 
importing machinery, was not necessary for rapid growth, the soft budget constraints that the SOE 
enjoyed where enough to permit an effective mobilization of the otherwise unemployed labor.” The 
mechanism behind this was that since the USSR did not enjoy full employment at the moment of the 
First Five-Year Plan, structural unemployment in the agricultural sector was enormous and growing, 
since mechanization was arriving to the countryside. Hence as marginal product of labor was equal to 
zero outside the cities, total output could be boosted by becoming workers for otherwise unemployed 
farmers. Thus, giving firms high objectives and credit would mean that they would not care for the 
marginal cost of labor, since minimizing costs were not their priorities. Consequently this was the 
source of growth in the Soviet Union during the 1930s. Nonetheless, as Cheremukhin et al. (2017) 
find, the growth rates of output were obtained at an extreme inefficient way. Indeed, one of the reasons 
that industrialization was deterred in the Russian Empire was a consequence of the personal comfort 
provoked by the favor treatments and subsidies of monopoly capitalism. Nonetheless, it should be 
mentioned, that Investment is one of the main variables that last for the whole period (1885-1940). 
Consequently,  it  could  be  mentioned  that  the  Tsarist  Russia  possible  reductions  in  the  frictions 
(temporary as it was oscillating around an stable number) could be transmitted through investment as 
the railroad expansion (Wheat Boom booster).
On the other hand, it was also expected the result that War Communism would have in the 
model.  The  extreme  situation  of  the  Russian  Civil  War,  just  after  the  worst  conflicts  until  the 
moment,World War I, could not have painted a more pessimistic panorama for Russia. Indeed, the 
situation already left the country without many of the previous skilled people. However, the policies 
applied by the Bolsheviky on the lands that they conquered day by day worsened the situation even 
more.  They  abolished  all  major  capitalist  institutions,  confiscated  land  holding  and  the  industrial 
capital from particular investors. Among their policies it also included forced requisitioning of food, 
redistribution  of  land,  nationalization  of  industry,  centralized  management  of  production  and 
resources, state monopoly of trade and the suspension of money transactions. The consequences of 
these acts translated into a determent of investment that made the frictions to sky-rocket. In addition it 
PWedge = β0,t + β1,t Invt + β3,tWarComt + β4,tL agPWedget + β5,t1FYPt
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should  be  said  that  the  demographic  convulsions  effect  could  have  been  transmitted  through  the 
indicator variable of War Communism, explaining its non significancy.  In the same way, inflation may 
have operated. The peak points for hyperinflation where those during War communism and after and 
before  this  episode  it  was  more  stable,  even  though  it  was  growing  during  the  Soviet  Union.In 
addition, it should be said that the market frictions of the production process were greatly determined 
by the values of the previous year since it followed a continuous evolution and is not an stochastic 
variable. As the economic growth theory has been suggesting (Galor & Moav, 2008), education may 
play and important role in enhancing  the structural change. Nevertheless, in this study, it has proven 
to be non significant. This fact can be caused by the fact that the companies had no need to hire new 
skilled workers since their profits were assured. In Soviet Russia, the logic would have change since 
the guidelines for a workplace do not follow the same incentives. Hence, the model is consistent with 
the literature behind the industrialization of the Soviet Union and the incapacity of the Russian Empire 
to perform this structural change. 
8    Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to construct a bridge between the Economic History Literature and Economic 
Growth Theory. In doing so, it tries to better understand the role of frictions in deterring or permitting 
industrialization.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  one  step  in  this  way  is  to  comprehend  the  attempts  to 
industrialize  during  the  government  of  Sergei  Witte,  or  the  modernizing  will  of  Stolypin.  Also 
understanding how the different policies, during Stalin, affected would be of importance. Indeed, the 
Lewis  model  of  economic  development  (1954)  used  Soviet  economic  growth  as  the  guide  for 
constructing the industrial sector through investment reallocation of unemployment. It should be said, 
nonetheless, that the Russian economy was growing fast and there were reforms that could set Russia 
on track to eventually become one of the wealthiest countries in Europe and, by extension, of the 
world. This does not imply that this would have happened necessarily, but it was heading in the right 
direction. 
Thus, the importance of studying, historically, how policies, conflicts, and different economic 
structures  may  boost  or  deter  economic  development  resides  on  the  fact  that  nations  with  great 
potential growth may not succeed in reaching their optimal performance. Hence, it would allow us to 
comprehend to a greater degree the evolution of societies in their own circumstances, being Russia a 
great  example of this deed.  Furthermore,  it  is  also interesting to observe what may happen when 
different policies are applied during the same period of time. This would explain why Witte’s and 
Stolypin’s efforts did not achieved their original purpose. This study also deepens into the research of 
the effects caused by War Communism and the Russian Civil war, what in words of Cheremukhin et 
al. (2017) is of particular importance for the Russian scholars.
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Hence, in order to achieve this objective an empirical model is proposed to fathom and capture 
the effects that the main economic variables, suggested in the literature, would have on the market 
frictions. The importance of this topic comes from the claim of many historians suggesting that market 
frictions were the most  important  obstacles to economic development in Russia.  Our findings are 
consistent  with  the  literature  and  growth  theory.  Particularly  we  found  that  the  reduction  in  the 
production wedge is vastly explained by the investments and the policies carried out during the First 
Five-Year Plan,  due to the existence of soft  budget constraints for the SOE, easy credit  from the 
Gosbank and high production objectives. This system provoked rapid industrialization since socialist 
companies’ objective was to maximize output not profit. Hence, it would not matter the fact that the 
marginal product of labor would have been greater than the marginal cost or wage. Thus, Soviet rapid 
industrialization was accomplished by growing through employment expansion. However, this method 
was highly inefficient in productivity terms.
In addition, our discoveries also explain the peak levels of frictions between 1918 and 1922. 
This was a consequence of the terrible situation that  Russia lived during that  time,  with millions 
perishing  in  the  wars,  famines  or  prosecutions.  Indeed,  the  devastation  caused  by  the  conflicts, 
collectivization and nationalization generated one of the worse experiences for the world’s biggest 
country.  Moreover,  this insight brings new information to this War period, which has so far been 
understudied. On the other hand, this model also explained why the Tsarist Period had no significancy 
in the wedge values, since frictions remained stable due to the fact that the same policies that caused it 
were carried out, monopoly capitalism. Moreover, this study provides more support to the rejection of 
the idea that the main driver of Russia’s industrialization was a “Big-Push” model implemented by 
Stalin’s economic goals. It has been seen that the inefficiency came from the stablished system, when 
higher  productivity  should  have  been  expected.  Furthermore,  it  rejects  further  the  idea  of  the 
obshchina being the main impediment to development in the Russian Empire. Hence, it should be said 
that while some policies conducted economic growth in the USSR in the beginning of the 1930s, the 
side effects of many policies like the collectivization made a scant contribution to growth and living 
standards.
Finally, it would be interesting to mention that this study could be potentially extended by 
constructing a panel data for the different Russian regions for the same period. This extension would 
provide a better insight by acknowledging the fixed effects. Moreover, another potential extension 
would be the study of the evolution of the frictions in the production process from the beginning of the 
19th century. This research could provide an intuition of how and when frictions emerged, since they 
were high and stable during the reign of Nikolay II. In addition, it would be appealing to expand the 
wedge  accounting  methodology  towards  other  situations  and  countries  in  history,  and  apply  the 
developed empirical strategy in our paper to link it with the literature. 
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Appendix A: Data
A) Wedge Production Component
The production component of the labor wedge has been taken from Cheremukhin et al (2017) for the 
period previous to the WWI and from 1928 until 1940. For 1914-1928 the production component of 
the labor wedge has been computed following the formula (5) in Section 4 of this paper. The data has 
been  taken  from  Markevich  &  Harrison  (2011)  for  the  WWI  period  and  also  from  the  IstMat 
(Istoricheskiye Materialny) and the Russian Statistics Library.
B) Investment
The  data  accounting  for  the  Investment  in  the  Manufacturing  sector  has  been  extracted  from 
Cheremukhin et al (2017). The researchers computed investments in each sector from the series of 
capital stocks assuming 5 percent depreciation. Simultaneously, they extracted the values for the GNP 
from NNP series in Gregory (1982), Table 3.1, by adding 5 percent depreciation to the total capital 
stock. The authors did not find reliable data for value added in manufacturing and agriculture for all 
years. Gregory also reports the breakdown of imperial and local government expenditures for selected 
years (Tables F.4 and G.4). Moreover, for the benchmark analysis we took defense expenditures as our 
measure of government sector and the scholars checked the robustness of our conclusion by added 
administrative expenditures. The data for the missing years was obtained by linear interpolation. To 
obtain relative prices, the  scholars  computed nominal value added of agriculture following the same 
steps as we did for the value added in agriculture in 1913 prices. The ratio of the two gives us a price 
deflator for agriculture. Gregory in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 reports net investments in current prices and 
1913 prices, which permitted to compute the investment price deflator and depreciation in current 
prices.
C) Production (Industry Output)
Reliable data for value added in manufacturing was extracted from Cheremukhin et al. (2017). The 
authors estimated the values for the the whole Imperial period and the Soviet Union until 1940 except 
the War Period (WWI and Civil War). In order to obtain the data, the authors took the evidence from 
Gregory (1982). Particularly, it was assumed that the fraction of value added of agricultural production 
to the retained consumption was at the same level as in 1913 to obtain the estimate of value added in 
agriculture during 1885-1913. Thus, the value added in manufacturing was obtained by subtracting the 
value added in agriculture from GNP. Gregory reported breakdown of imperial and local government 
expenditures for selected years (Tables F.4 and G.4). However, a bi-sector economy (agriculture and 
manufacture)  was  considered  in  Cheremukhin  et  al  (2017).  Therefore  the  manufacturing  sector 
 35
From Sickle to Hammer Guillem Blasco i Piles
incorporated the military and the government expenditure (civilian services). Nonetheless, the authors 
checked  the  robustness  of  their  conclusion  with  positive  results.  Finally,  for  the  war  period 
(1914-1928),  the  data  obtained  by  Markevich  &  Harrison  (2011)  was  used.  These  results  were 
classified into different categories. Consequently, in this paper they were added up to form a dual 
economy, where the gross industrial output is equivalent to the manufacturing output, coinciding with 
the estimates of Cheremukhin et al (2017). These results were checked with the statistical book of 
Kafengaus (1994) about the evolution of industrial production of Russia, with a satisfactory outcome. 
D) Inflation
The values for price indexes, CPI evolution or the inflation are non-existent or incomplete for the 
whole analyzed period previous to this study. Consequently, it has been considered to take the amount 
of  currency in circulation (in millions of  rubles,  1913) as a proxy for Inflation.  The main reason 
supporting this assumption, besides the fact that since velocity of money was not highly determinant 
for the period except WWI (Efremov, 2012), lays on the fact that for the Imperial period the financial 
markets in Russia were not developed enough and suffered from backwardness in comparison to the 
English,  German or  French financial  systems,  as  stated  by  Allen  (2003).  Moreover,  in  tune  with 
Efremov (2012) for the Soviet period, the official inflation may not indicate the real one, since due to 
the monetary restructures, the ban on foreign exchange rates and the prices policies (scissors policy) 
would  lead  to  the  existence  of  a  repressed  inflation  not  represented  in  the  official  accounts. 
Consequently, a conversion of the soviet ruble is carried out, in order to provide a faithful accountancy 
for the currency in circulation, expressing the subjacent inflation for the whole studied period.  In 
addition, it should be mentioned that for an important amount of years the currency was pegged to the 
gold standard, 1897-1914 and 1922-1930 (the later with the chervonets). In order to proceed with the 
extrapolation of the data, the values have been extracted from Drummond (1976). Indeed, the author 
provided the amount of currency in circulation in 1913 rubles (₽) for 1885-1914. For the previously 
missing data at the WWI, the data was taken from Markevich & Harrison (2011) where the estimated 
values for the 1914-1924 lapse are provided in 1913’s rubles. Furthermore, for the Soviet period, the 
values were taken from the 1924’s ruble, established by the Gosbank completing the monetary reform 
initiated in 1922, and the amount of currency in circulation for that time, in order to obtain the amount 
of cash and banknotes in 1913 values. The 1924’s currency was exchanged for 50,000 rubles of the 
1923  issue  or  5  million  rubles  of  1922.  Consequently,  the  exchange  wound  be  1₽  of  1924  is 
50,000,000,000₽ of the issues prior to 1922 (1893-1922). Finally, the amount of 1924’s currency in 
circulation has  been taken from the pages of  the archives  of  the bank of  the Russian federation, 
particularly from the figure: “Cash issued in circulation, by issue balance sheets at the end of the year, 
million ₽” (rus.: наличные деньги, выпущенные в обращение, по эмиссионным балансам на конец 
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года,  МЛН.  ₽.).  The resulting estimation fits well the literature of the inflation during the studied 
period. 
E) Manufacturing Net Import and Protectionism
The data for the total volume of exports and imports for Tsarist Russia is extracted from Gregory 
(1982), Table M-1. Moreover, the data from Davies (1990, Table 56) is used to find the composition of 
exports and imports for 1913. Thus it is assumed that this composition holds for 1885-1913, since 
Kitanina (1995) showed that the composition of trade changed very slowly in 1899-1913 (there are no 
reliable data before 1899). The share of industrial products in exports was 4.7% in 1899-1903 and 
5.6% in 1913; the share of industrial products in imports was 29.3% in 1899-1903 and 32.8% in 1913. 
Hence, the net exports of agricultural goods and net imports of non-agriculture goods are computed. 
On the other hand, from Davies et al. (1994), the volume of exports and imports for the USSR from 
1928 to 1938 is extracted. They provided an index of exports and imports relative to 1913, and the 
scholars use the numbers for 1913 trade from Gregory (1982) to obtain the volume of trade in 1913 
prices. The authors impute the values for 1939 and 1940 by assuming that they remain at the 1938 
level. They use the data from Davies (1990, Table 58) to find composition of exports and imports for 
1927/1928. They assume that the same composition holds for 1928-1940 and compute net exports of 
agricultural goods and net imports of non-agricultural goods. 
F) Population
The population for the fifty six year lapse of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union have been 
taken,  primarily,  from  Gregory  (1982),  Table  3.1.,  and  Davies  (1994),  Table  7.  However,  some 
modification were taken into account, in order to improve the accuracy and reliability of the treated 
data. Indeed, the only imperial population census was held in 1897 and, in the following years, the 
authorities registered the deaths and births more precisely. Nonetheless, they did not count the out-
migration of peasants to cities or to Siberia. Thus, they calculated simultaneously these newcomers at 
their new residences. Therefore, the data was erroneously gathered, creating a double counting that 
overstated the real population. Moreover, the convention for treating the Russian Empire population 
consisted of deducting the population of Finland from the Empire. It should be mentioned that Finland 
was  incorporated  to  the  Russian  Empire  in  1809,  as  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Finland,  and  became 
independent in 1917. Hence, it did not form part of the USSR and it was also a different entity during 
the Empire,  since after  the  Finnish war,  between Sweden and Russia,  the  Diet  of  Porvoo (1809) 
pledged  allegiance  to  Aleksander  I  of  Russia  who  in  return  guaranteed  that  the  area's  laws  and 
liberties,  as well  as religion,  would be left  unchanged. In addition,  it  has been considered in this 
research that the population of Poland was also to be subtracted. In order to accomplish this objective, 
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the population for Congress Poland (Privislinsky Krai or Vistula Country) was estimated from 1885 to 
1915/1918 and subtracted from the total Russian population (excluding Finland already). The logic 
behind  this  action  was  that  Poland  just  lasted  in  Russia  until  the  WWI,  hence  the  changes  in 
population due to  the unrest  of  that  period could have seemed even bigger  than the actual  ones. 
Moreover, during the USSR, Poland was not part of it until its last partition with the Molotov-Von 
Ribbentrop Pact and the subsequent invasion in 1940. Moreover, the data from Davies (1994) and 
Gregory (1982) lacked the war period population since the first Soviet census was conducted in 1926. 
Consequently, the population on the eve of the First World War was estimated by primarily using data 
from  the  registration  of  births  and  deaths  for  the  years  1897-1914.  Moreover,  the  war  period 
population was extracted from Markevich & Harrison (2011), where the authors fill the gap in the 
national accounts of Russia and the USSR in the twentieth century, 1913 to 1928. From this paper it 
could be found that the Russian economy did somewhat better in the Great War than was previously 
thought; in the Civil War it did correspondingly worse; war losses persisted into peacetime, and were 
not fully restored under the New Economic Policy. The Great War and Civil War produced the deepest 
economic trauma of Russia’s troubled twentieth century. 
G) Literacy Rate
The literacy rate for the Russian Empire was estimated, taking the basic evidence from the work of 
Mironov (1991), which computed the average rate for the whole Russian population by decades (men, 
women, rural and urban), from 1717 until 1917. Hence, in our study, the literacy growth rate has been 
interpolated from the averaged decades and for specific years, from the different population censuses 
and data available from the Russian Statistics Library and the IstMat (Istoricheskiye Materialny). The 
interpolated data adapted to the historical events correctly. Moreover, for the Soviet Union period, 
from 1928 until 1940, the literacy rates were extracted from Cheremukhin et al. (2017), by averaging 
the Rural and Urban literacy rates provided by the authors. In addition, it should be mentioned the fact 
that the the war period has been also estimated in an attempt to link the deceleration suffered in the 
Tsarist territory against the promotion in the Soviet Territory (LikBez), this estimates were taken  from 
Markevich & Harrison (2011).
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1885 2,82 502,25 3915,29 901 299,85 101.860 0,2060
1886 3,18 405,85 4011,91 950 304,65 103.581 0,2110
1887 3,03 431,80 4835,56 982 239,43 105.302 0,2160
1888 3,21 515,30 4761,40 982 167,58 107.023 0,2180
1889 3,18 708,25 5011,50 940 258,73 108.450 0,2200
1890 3,12 343,60 4651,61 902 221,66 109.744 0,2301
1891 3,01 382,65 4886,37 977 193,85 110.422 0,2403
1892 2,46 793,55 4697,30 1070 281,25 111.100 0,2504
1893 2,65 1203,55 5001,10 1084 319,40 113.059 0,2605
1894 3,94 1606,30 6298,37 1072 394,15 114.018 0,2706
1895 3,41 -119,65 5698,44 1048 352,69 114.865 0,2808
1896 3,94 1298,80 6618,40 1055 431,37 115.712 0,2909
1897 4,15 1512,65 7148,12 1068 391,72 117.241 0,3010
1898 3,23 1175,05 6981,53 901 425,12 118.372 0,3073
1899 3,19 922,85 7564,02 662 485,15 119.546 0,3137
1900 3,17 984,10 7631,50 491 445,71 120.186 0,3200
1901 3,64 1248,15 8802,83 555 392,80 124.806 0,3247
1902 3,28 1783,15 9068,75 523 354,96 126.613 0,3294
1903 3,58 896,15 8507,31 578 375,56 128.419 0,3341
1904 3,11 1185,25 9449,49 854 360,45 130.418 0,3389
1905 3,98 171,25 9554,01 1208 329,27 133.225 0,3436
1906 4,15 1184,65 9251,99 1195 437,92 135.044 0,3483
1907 2,89 1159,20 8413,32 1155 492,88 137.862 0,3530
1908 2,71 1223,40 9401,62 1087 587,23 140.640 0,3608
1909 2,92 1259,90 9885,25 1174 456,36 142.328 0,3687
1910 3,77 1872,50 11098,84 1235 586,22 144.533 0,3765
1911 4,08 1744,55 11275,42 1327 591,53 146.003 0,3843
1912 3,38 1781,20 11161,60 1495 614,78 148.261 0,3922
1913 3,78 1781,20 11296,00 1630 769,66 150.391 0,4000
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1914 2,86 1961,20 11589,00 2947 824,54 152.127 0,4058
1915 2,75 2100,5 12162,00 5617 902,75 154.249 0,4115
1916 2,94 1570,7 11265,00 9097 785,48 153.851 0,4173
1917 3,24 876 8398,50 18917 620,31 152.807 0,4230
1918 3,73 181,3 3666,00 27300 554,7 148.057 0,4290
1919 5,67 -818,70 2901,00 60800 498,9 144.829 0,4350
1920 7,3 -1183,6 3353,00 225014 318,8 142.829 0,4410
1921 7,8 -1700,5 3083,00 1168600 214 139.068 0,4803
1922 7,2 -1234,28 3411,00 17543900 147,5 137.684 0,5196
1923 6,95 -668,33 3935,00 1994500000 259 137.827 0,5589
1924 7,05 53,42 4948,00 178510000000 398,7 140.196 0,5981
1925 6,84 354,68 6583,00 50000 425,34 143.163 0,6374
1926 6,53 749,35 8199,00 125000 479,8 145.781 0,6767
1927 6,31 1185,72 9032,00 150000 513,7 148.656 0,7160
1928 5,32 1409,43 10137,85 200000 599,10 151.522 0,7320
1929 4,02 1562,98 11250,35 250000 484,65 154.687 0,7480
1930 2,59 3351,60 12879,93 300000 569,88 156.100 0,7640
1931 2,17 3942,32 13976,76 350000 779,65 158.600 0,7800
1932 1,71 2612,81 14509,51 475000 476,94 160.800 0,7960
1933 1,53 2916,79 14775,88 400000 191,75 159.800 0,8120
1934 1,3 3545,11 16468,13 450000 202,01 157.500 0,8280
1935 1,32 5578,95 18755,81 500000 286,11 159.200 0,8440
1936 1,14 5279,67 21842,60 750000 366,85 161.300 0,8600
1937 1,41 5706,65 23064,79 1000000 325,58 164.000 0,8760
1938 1,23 5706,65 24380,98 1500000 440,18 167.000 0,8920
1939 1,17 7811,79 26370,95 2000000 440,18 168.524 0,8970
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Appendix C: Econometric Tests
Durbin-Watson Critical Values at 5%, n = 55, k = 5
  dL = 1,3743
  dU = 1,7681
Durbin-Watson d-statistic(  k = 5,    55) =   0.980728
Durbin-Watson h-statistic: -.1708061  t = -1.116675  P-value =  0.2698
  Tests of Endogeneity
  Ho: variables are exogenous
  Robust score chi2(1)            =  1.36214  (p = 0.2432)
  Robust regression F(1,48)       =  1.57656  (p = 0.2153)
Tests of endogeneity
  Ho: variables are exogenous
  Robust score chi2(1)               =  1.36214  (p = 0.2432)
  Robust regression F(1,48)       =  1.57656  (p = 0.2153)
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):      13.355
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =         0.0013
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):         858.392
                         (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):                 1964.867
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size   19.93
                                         15% maximal IV size             11.59
                                         20% maximal IV size              8.75
                                         25% maximal IV size              7.25
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.
NB: Critical values are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors.
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):    0.029
                                                           Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.8656
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